This Time, Team Trump Wants Tariffs

Economic nationalism has been a rhetorical pillar of the former president Donald Trump’s message since he first entered the 2016 race. His vision for trade and industrial policy overturned decades of GOP orthodoxy and won over millions of Americans left behind by globalization and deindustrialization. Yet, during his presidency, Trump struggled to enact economic nationalist policies, which conflicted with the entrenched economic views of his advisers, donors, and staff.

As Trump makes trade protection a centerpiece of his 2024 platform, an uncomfortable question still lingers: Will his administration follow through? “Personnel is policy” is a mantra familiar to anyone privy to conversations about staffing the next Trump administration. This also extends to the people around Trump—his most trusted donors, informal advisors, etc.—who shape his priorities even if they are not appointees. Unlike before, Trump may very well have a growing circle of influential advisors and donors who share his vision for fair trade and reindustrialization.

To evaluate the prospects for trade policy in a putative second Trump administration, we first must consider what transpired during Trump’s presidency. Of course, the administration successfully imposed massive tariffs on the People’s Republic of China, starting a trade war and effecting a historic shift in the U.S.-China relationship. Spearheaded by the highly capable U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and his well-aligned staff, the Trump trade policy has been one of the administration’s most enduring achievements. Along with Trump’s tariffs on steel, aluminum, and solar panels, the tariffs on China have been maintained, if amended, by the Biden administration.

Many of Trump’s other goals for trade and industrial policy nevertheless went unfulfilled by the end of his term. A fifth column of free-market-fundamentalists and Never Trumpers in the congressional GOP had compromised the legislative potential of the 2017-19. During that critical period, Congress failed to take up Trump’s infrastructure proposals, ignored his call for anti-offshoring legislation, and instead approved a package of tax cuts with some merit but little to direct new growth towards fixed capital investment in manufacturing. 

Congressional intransigence aside, other executive-led initiatives were not as successful as the Chinese tariffs. Reasonable tariffs on goods from the EU, which protects its own markets from U.S. exports, met with international controversy and eventual removal. Likewise, tariffs on Canada and Mexico amounted to very little. NAFTA’s replacement with the just marginally improved USMCA did not reverse the decades of damage inflicted by one of the worst trade deals in the history of trade deals. Infighting among senior administration officials over trade policy may have compromised the administration’s position in critical trade negotiations. 

Perhaps because of these setbacks, Trump has redoubled his commitment to a tough trade policy on the 2024 campaign trail. He now promises to enact tariffs of 60 percent on Chinese goods and 10 percent on all imported goods—in effect, returning America to the protectionist posture that was our historical norm. Despite a great cacophony from doomsaying economists, Trump seems determined to realize his first administration’s promise of a revolution in U.S. trade policy. He has even suggested replacing the income tax entirely with tariffs, a politically fanciful idea that nevertheless signals his commitment to tariffs. Moreover, he chose a pro-industrial policy vice presidential nominee and still listens to his hawkish trade advisors Peter Navarro and Lighthizer.

What’s more, the legal and procedural obstacles for President Trump to enact his desired tariffs are minimal. Recent analysis by CSIS found that the president has sufficiently broad legal authority to unilaterally impose massive import duties, with no legislation required. Of course, that possibility may not become reality if the administration is mired in infighting and internal resistance.

Most ruinous to Trump’s trade vision would be economic policymakers and advisors who quietly cling to Republican free-market orthodoxy and restrain or subvert President Trump’s desires for trade and industrial policy. Trump has no shortage of committed free-traders among his closest advisers, namely Larry Kudlow, Kevin Hassett, the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the billionaire hedge fund manager John Paulson, whom Trump has publicly suggested as a potential Treasury Secretary. The greatest risk is that these advisors will amplify the media’s already alarmist rhetoric about protective tariffs to persuade Trump to weaken or drop his pledged package.

In Trump’s last administration, a ringleader of this resistance was none other than donor-turned–Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, whom the New York Times identified as one of the administration’s “strongest voices for the free-trade position.” Publicly, Mnuchin toed the pro-tariff line, but he provided internal resistance to Trump’s economic nationalism. It was Mnuchin’s feud with Navarro that reportedly weakened the American negotiating stance with China in the pivotal trade talks of 2018.

Crucially, some of Trump’s key donors and likely appointees now appear to genuinely support his economic agenda. This camp of free-trade skeptics extends beyond Trump’s established retinue of trade hawks, led by Lighthizer and Navarro, who are both likely to return to the administration. Lighthizer has even been floated for Treasury Secretary. Trump’s circle of advisors has grown to include some new voices who could be powerful advocates for the president’s trade and industrial policies.

One of the most encouraging figures among Trump’s new circle of friends is Scott Bessent, ironically George Soros’s former chief investment officer. Though not a factor in Trump’s earlier campaigns or the first administration, Bessent has become “Trump’s New Obsession,” per a recent Wall Street Journal profile—one of his most respected economic advisers, and even a contender to be Secretary of the Treasury. His newfound prominence is a great boon to the prospects for real trade reform in the next administration. 

Most importantly, Bessent is a reasonable and articulate interlocutor for an economic agenda that faces considerable public scrutiny and controversy. Speaking at the National Conservatism Conference in July, Bessent explained the inherent value of tariffs:

Industrial policy solutions that rely on changing relative prices at the market level create better outcomes and will tend to be more effective than what we have seen from the Biden administration, which requires the government to pick winners and losers. This is why tariffs can be a potent economic tool since they operate at the market level.

Such authentic support of tariffs is rare in Washington and has been for at least a generation. To have “one of the most brilliant men on Wall Street,” as Trump calls Bessent, endorse his trade agenda undoubtedly strengthens Trump’s resolve. As Trump lavishes praise on Bessent and the once-private investor talks to the press, one might expect that he will play a role in the next administration.

Another surprising trade hawk is Howard Lutnick, co-chair of the 2024 presidential transition team and billionaire CEO of financial services firm Cantor Fitzgerald. Speaking at the Madison Square Garden rally on October 27, Lutnick denounced NAFTA, decried offshoring, and defined America First as “American citizens employed first.” Lutnick recently endorsed Trump’s tariffs (in tandem with corporate tax cuts), stating, “Tariffs will protect our farmers. Manufacturing will employ our people and energy will drive down our costs.” 

Elite opinion, more broadly, has quietly shifted in favor of a new attitude towards trade and industrial policies. This can be seen on Wall Street with Bessent and Lutnick as well as in Washington, where the respected Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a likely senior Trump appointee, has endorsed trade restrictions on friendly countries to promote reciprocity. Meanwhile, the increasingly conservative tech sector has become fascinated with rebuilding the defense industrial base (and securing lucrative government contracts). Even Elon Musk, no great friend of tariffs, has supported Trump’s plan, noting that it may cause “temporary hardship […] When the storm passes and everyone realizes we are on sounder footing, there will be a rapid recovery to a healthier, sustainable economy.” 

The prospects for real trade reform in a second Trump administration appear surprisingly bright. Some of the next Trump administration’s top economic officials could almost certainly be free-trade skeptics who want to support American industry and reverse the damage of globalization. In general, Trump’s trade and industrial policy proposals seem to be more popular among GOP donors and policymakers than they have ever been before. The president’s nationalist economic agenda may progress much further in his second administration than it did in the first. 

Even as support for Trump’s trade policy grows, adoption and implementation in his potential second term will prove difficult. Tariffs on friendly countries in Europe and Asia have been and will be a tough sell; most of the GOP only tolerates industrial policy and trade restrictions in the context of the “U.S.–China great power competition.” Internal ideological resistance is a major problem, but Trump may have the political momentum and human capital to overcome it. In his speeches and policy proposals, Trump has made it clear that, if elected, he wants to bring a quick and decisive end to the free-trade era in American economic history. With friends like his, he might be able to pull it off. 

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