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To Resolve the Ukraine War, Repair Russian-Western Ties

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To Resolve the Ukraine War, Repair Russian-Western Ties

President Trump understands how to end the conflict.

Spasskaya,Tower,,Moscow,Kremlin,,Saint,Basil's,Cathedral,In,Moscow,,Russia.

Credit: Catarina Belova/Shutterstock

The mainstream press judged President Donald Trump’s inability to secure a full 30-day ceasefire agreement with Russia to be an unequivocal failure

But such analysis betrays an ignorance of the challenges involved. Competent negotiating demands knowledge of not only what you want, but also what your opponent is willing to give. There must be a starting point; mutual concessions reflective of each side’s position at the outset are an inherent part of the process. Russia’s battlefield advantage and distrust of the West have made it reluctant to end the war. Trump’s ability to get Moscow to endorse a partial ceasefire was thus a meaningful step forward.

Other observers had expected, based on a sound assessment of the military facts, that Moscow would reject any ceasefire proposal out of hand. Russia’s war machine is steadily progressing toward the achievement of the strategic objectives laid out by Vladimir Putin in June 2024, namely, Moscow’s control of four regions in eastern Ukraine and Kiev’s demilitarization. For Russia to voluntarily cede the military initiative would jeopardize those objectives. Meanwhile, a 30-day pause to all fighting would provide Ukraine with crucial breathing space to rearm, mobilize forces, and fortify its defensive positions.

However, Trump may yet coax Putin into a full ceasefire, since Moscow also has political goals that are broader than its military objectives. Clausewitz’s oft-cited axiom that war is a continuation of politics by other means is vital background for discerning the other objectives that the Kremlin has been trying to achieve in its so-called “Special Military Operation.” Moscow’s political goals include nothing less than a reworking of the transatlantic security architecture. The upshot is that Moscow may be willing to compromise its military advantage if this goal seems achievable by diplomatic means.

The development of the war and the rise of Trump’s America First platform have exposed the divergence in interests within the transatlantic alliance. The U.S. is pushing Europe toward a greater degree of military autonomy. If successful, this effort could contribute to a more stable security situation that corresponds to the actual balance of forces on the continent. Moscow would welcome that prospect not because it would perceive an independent Europe as a weak target for future aggression, but rather as a more equal countervailing force that doesn’t pose an unmanageable threat.

Current geopolitical tensions are largely a result of this ongoing transition—the birth pangs of a fundamentally different order. Normalizing relations between the U.S. and Russia is now inextricable from ending the war in Ukraine. However, since this will upset the current system, there is incentive for the beneficiaries of that system—i.e., the European countries who have effectively offshored their defense to the United States—to obstruct any such resolution. 

Moscow, for its part, likely perceives potential in working with Washington to stabilize the situation in Ukraine, precisely because the U.S. president and his partners understand the need for a systemic transition and have even characterized the present confrontation with Russia to be contrary to U.S. interests. 

What’s more, Trump’s effort to bring about a more balanced order in Europe has gotten some European leaders to reconsider their hardline stance toward Russia. In an extremely consequential about-face, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced, following a meeting with Trump, that Kiev’s entry to NATO is “no longer under consideration.” Rutte also stated that NATO troops likely won’t take part in guaranteeing a ceasefire. Perhaps most surprisingly, Rutte even said that repairing relations with Russia will be necessary after the war is over. 

Trump’s willingness to dispense with his predecessor’s democracy vs. autocracy framing has shifted focus away from ideological delusions to concrete security concerns and battlefield conditions. As special envoy Steve Witkoff said in a recent podcast conversation, Moscow does not want to conquer and govern western Ukraine, since that would be a near impossible task given strong anti-Russian sentiment in the region. At the same time, Russia has a direct interest in ensuring that the country on its western border doesn’t become a NATO outpost after the war—something that Washington can help ensure. By understanding these interests, Trump may be able to win meaningful concessions from Moscow despite Russia’s advantages on the battlefield.

Trump will certainly try to use American aid to Ukraine as leverage to get Moscow to make further concessions in an eventual settlement—but also to force Kiev to drop its unachievable demands. The same goes for the machinations of certain European leaders that aim to escalate the war. Now that the assumption of endless American support to Ukraine and Europe is doubtful, Moscow knows that any “coalition of the willing” will threaten nothing more than bombastic rhetoric. The Europeans, in their heart, know this too.

That Putin directed his response to the ceasefire proposal specifically to his “American colleagues, partners” was no surprise. Moscow rightly considers the United States to have the final say on its allies’ military action. Putin, like Trump, understands that the Russia-Ukraine War is part of a broader conflict between Russia and the U.S.-led West. As Moscow has said, any cessation of the war must “lead to lasting peace and eliminate the initial causes of the crisis.”

For Moscow, that means addressing the geographic growth of NATO and expanded scope of its mission. Russia has viewed the alliance’s eastward march not only as a direct security threat, but as a repudiation of its great power status and sphere of influence. As then-U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns emphasized in the now famous “Nyet Means Nyet” cable, Russian leaders across the political spectrum consider Ukraine’s accession to the alliance as “the brightest of all red lines.” Now that the Trump administration has taken NATO membership off the table and prodded European leaders to entertain a more viable relationship with Russia after the Ukraine war is resolved, Moscow has every reason to end the conflict and begin the slow process of reintegrating with the West.

Whether the Ukraine war will be resolved diplomatically is a question of political vision and will, since it will require creating a new security architecture in Europe that respects both Western and Russian interests. For the first time in three decades, the possibility of a more balanced European order has emerged. Sadly, it seems to have required a tragic and brutal war to open that possibility.

The post To Resolve the Ukraine War, Repair Russian-Western Ties appeared first on The American Conservative.

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To Resolve the Ukraine War, Repair Russian-Western Ties

President Trump understands how to end the conflict.

Spasskaya,Tower,,Moscow,Kremlin,,Saint,Basil's,Cathedral,In,Moscow,,Russia.

Credit: Catarina Belova/Shutterstock

The mainstream press judged President Donald Trump’s inability to secure a full 30-day ceasefire agreement with Russia to be an unequivocal failure

But such analysis betrays an ignorance of the challenges involved. Competent negotiating demands knowledge of not only what you want, but also what your opponent is willing to give. There must be a starting point; mutual concessions reflective of each side’s position at the outset are an inherent part of the process. Russia’s battlefield advantage and distrust of the West have made it reluctant to end the war. Trump’s ability to get Moscow to endorse a partial ceasefire was thus a meaningful step forward.

Other observers had expected, based on a sound assessment of the military facts, that Moscow would reject any ceasefire proposal out of hand. Russia’s war machine is steadily progressing toward the achievement of the strategic objectives laid out by Vladimir Putin in June 2024, namely, Moscow’s control of four regions in eastern Ukraine and Kiev’s demilitarization. For Russia to voluntarily cede the military initiative would jeopardize those objectives. Meanwhile, a 30-day pause to all fighting would provide Ukraine with crucial breathing space to rearm, mobilize forces, and fortify its defensive positions.

However, Trump may yet coax Putin into a full ceasefire, since Moscow also has political goals that are broader than its military objectives. Clausewitz’s oft-cited axiom that war is a continuation of politics by other means is vital background for discerning the other objectives that the Kremlin has been trying to achieve in its so-called “Special Military Operation.” Moscow’s political goals include nothing less than a reworking of the transatlantic security architecture. The upshot is that Moscow may be willing to compromise its military advantage if this goal seems achievable by diplomatic means.

The development of the war and the rise of Trump’s America First platform have exposed the divergence in interests within the transatlantic alliance. The U.S. is pushing Europe toward a greater degree of military autonomy. If successful, this effort could contribute to a more stable security situation that corresponds to the actual balance of forces on the continent. Moscow would welcome that prospect not because it would perceive an independent Europe as a weak target for future aggression, but rather as a more equal countervailing force that doesn’t pose an unmanageable threat.

Current geopolitical tensions are largely a result of this ongoing transition—the birth pangs of a fundamentally different order. Normalizing relations between the U.S. and Russia is now inextricable from ending the war in Ukraine. However, since this will upset the current system, there is incentive for the beneficiaries of that system—i.e., the European countries who have effectively offshored their defense to the United States—to obstruct any such resolution. 

Moscow, for its part, likely perceives potential in working with Washington to stabilize the situation in Ukraine, precisely because the U.S. president and his partners understand the need for a systemic transition and have even characterized the present confrontation with Russia to be contrary to U.S. interests. 

What’s more, Trump’s effort to bring about a more balanced order in Europe has gotten some European leaders to reconsider their hardline stance toward Russia. In an extremely consequential about-face, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced, following a meeting with Trump, that Kiev’s entry to NATO is “no longer under consideration.” Rutte also stated that NATO troops likely won’t take part in guaranteeing a ceasefire. Perhaps most surprisingly, Rutte even said that repairing relations with Russia will be necessary after the war is over. 

Trump’s willingness to dispense with his predecessor’s democracy vs. autocracy framing has shifted focus away from ideological delusions to concrete security concerns and battlefield conditions. As special envoy Steve Witkoff said in a recent podcast conversation, Moscow does not want to conquer and govern western Ukraine, since that would be a near impossible task given strong anti-Russian sentiment in the region. At the same time, Russia has a direct interest in ensuring that the country on its western border doesn’t become a NATO outpost after the war—something that Washington can help ensure. By understanding these interests, Trump may be able to win meaningful concessions from Moscow despite Russia’s advantages on the battlefield.

Trump will certainly try to use American aid to Ukraine as leverage to get Moscow to make further concessions in an eventual settlement—but also to force Kiev to drop its unachievable demands. The same goes for the machinations of certain European leaders that aim to escalate the war. Now that the assumption of endless American support to Ukraine and Europe is doubtful, Moscow knows that any “coalition of the willing” will threaten nothing more than bombastic rhetoric. The Europeans, in their heart, know this too.

That Putin directed his response to the ceasefire proposal specifically to his “American colleagues, partners” was no surprise. Moscow rightly considers the United States to have the final say on its allies’ military action. Putin, like Trump, understands that the Russia-Ukraine War is part of a broader conflict between Russia and the U.S.-led West. As Moscow has said, any cessation of the war must “lead to lasting peace and eliminate the initial causes of the crisis.”

For Moscow, that means addressing the geographic growth of NATO and expanded scope of its mission. Russia has viewed the alliance’s eastward march not only as a direct security threat, but as a repudiation of its great power status and sphere of influence. As then-U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns emphasized in the now famous “Nyet Means Nyet” cable, Russian leaders across the political spectrum consider Ukraine’s accession to the alliance as “the brightest of all red lines.” Now that the Trump administration has taken NATO membership off the table and prodded European leaders to entertain a more viable relationship with Russia after the Ukraine war is resolved, Moscow has every reason to end the conflict and begin the slow process of reintegrating with the West.

Whether the Ukraine war will be resolved diplomatically is a question of political vision and will, since it will require creating a new security architecture in Europe that respects both Western and Russian interests. For the first time in three decades, the possibility of a more balanced European order has emerged. Sadly, it seems to have required a tragic and brutal war to open that possibility.

The post To Resolve the Ukraine War, Repair Russian-Western Ties appeared first on The American Conservative.

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