On this episode of Dinner SOS, the BA Bake Club is back with a recipe that combines two breakfast darlings into one: coffee cake scones. 

​On this episode of Dinner SOS, the BA Bake Club is back with a recipe that combines two breakfast darlings into one: coffee cake scones. 

Matcha tints this refreshing noodle dish a delightful green hue—and imparts its characteristic grassy flavor. 

​Matcha tints this refreshing noodle dish a delightful green hue—and imparts its characteristic grassy flavor. 

Foreign Affairs

Trump’s Baffling Two-Step on Iran

The president is probably concealing his diplomatic bottom line to ward off pro-Israel hawks.

A U.S.-proposed nuclear deal given to Tehran on Saturday allows it to continue enriching uranium to low levels on Iranian soil, Axios reported Monday morning. 

That would permit Tehran to produce nuclear fuel suitable for civilian energy purposes, but not for nuclear weapons. Since Tehran would oppose any agreement that blocked its ability to enrich uranium, proponents of U.S.–Iran diplomacy were thrilled by the news—but not for long.

“WE WILL NOT ALLOW ANY ENRICHMENT OF URANIUM!” wrote President Donald Trump on social media Monday evening.

What’s going on here?

It’s not entirely clear, and that’s likely by design. Throughout Trump’s second term, his administration has sent mixed signals about its demands, suggesting a deliberate pattern of obfuscation and contradiction. Sometimes Trump officials—and Trump himself—indicate that low levels of enrichment will be allowed under a deal; other times they emphatically deny that to be the case.

The question is why.

My best guess: The administration is publicly misrepresenting what kind of Iran deal it would be willing to strike. Notably, that involves exaggerating demands not merely for the purpose of gaining leverage vis-à-vis Iran, though the administration has been doing that as well. Rather, the duplicity is primarily meant to stave off criticism from pro-Israel forces who desire the full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear energy program—and who mount a fierce resistance after any suggestion that Tehran can continue enriching uranium.

Experts I reached out to this week see things much the same. Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute told me in an email that the confusing public rhetoric, though flawed, offers the administration two benefits. “On the one hand, it delays the onslaught of attacks from pro-Israel elements who will not be satisfied with any deal with Iran,” Parsi said. “On the other hand, it is consistent with Trump’s negotiation style to take exaggerated maximalist positions at the outset of a negotiation in order to elicit concessions from the other side.”

Of course, there are other ways to account for the latest apparent rendition of Trump’s “no enrichment” two-step. 

One possibility: Axios simply got the story wrong. It wouldn’t be the first time.

Indeed, it wouldn’t have been the first time even this week. The reporter, Barak Ravid, one day earlier wrote that Ukraine had pre-notified the White House of a drone attack deep inside Russia. Within hours after publication, “did notify” became “did not notify.” Obviously, one version of that story must be wrong. Maybe Ravid’s newer story is as well.

Still, Ravid is normally a reliable journalist known for bringing the goods on exclusive scoops, sometimes to the bewilderment of political leaders. “You know what’s going on,” Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky told Ravid in February. “Where do you get this information?” 

In the case of Ravid’s report on Iran diplomacy, his information came from “two sources with direct knowledge—one of whom provided a point-by-point breakdown.” And this report, unlike the one on Ukraine’s drone attack, hasn’t been corrected.

On Tuesday, other outlets corroborated Ravid’s claims. The New York Times had reported on Saturday that the U.S.-proposed agreement—the first formal one delivered to Tehran—forbade uranium enrichment. But by Tuesday, the Gray Lady had gathered new information. Times reporters Farnaz Fassihi, David Sanger, and Jonathan Swan wrote,

The Trump administration is proposing an arrangement that would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium at low levels while the United States and other countries work out a more detailed plan intended to block Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon but give it access to fuel for new nuclear power plants.

As the authors note, Trump’s Monday night denial that the proposal allowed Iran to enrich any uranium may have pertained to the eventual, comprehensive deal, not to the interim arrangement. So, not quite a lie, but an evasive truth.

And maybe even more evasive than it seems. On X, I asked Greg Priddy, Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest, whether the administration’s inconsistency on enrichment resulted from White House infighting, simple incoherence, or a deliberate strategy to ward off Iran hawks.

“We don’t know, but I am beginning to think the latter,” Priddy said. “And we may end up with an ‘interim’ agreement which effectively becomes the end state because once the initial restrictions are in place, no U.S. pres is going to want to fight a war over transparent LEU [Low Enriched Uranium] enrichment.”

Iran hawks too were skeptical that the proposed arrangement would actually lead to a suspension of enrichment on Iranian soil. Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies wrote on X that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei “may love this deal” because it would buy Tehran time to build nuclear weapons.

Dubowitz’s comment was typical of how Iran hawks have reacted to signs that the White House will make concessions on enrichment. In April, after Special Envoy Steve Witkoff suggested on Fox News that Trump was seeking to limit but not eliminate Iran’s enrichment program, anti-Iranian hardliners in America and Israel pounced. Ellie Geranmayeh of the European Council on Foreign Relations told me in an email, “This backlash in my view cornered Witkoff to walk back.” The next day, Witkoff reversed course. “Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program,” he insisted.

Judging by this week’s reports, the administration has remained more flexible on the matter than Witkoff’s emphatic statement had suggested.

Unfortunately, to Tehran this flexibility looks like continual goalpost-shifting and chaotic diplomacy. While the Trump administration’s uncompromising public statements seem primarily intended for a domestic audience, Iranian leaders hear them as well, and they react accordingly, as Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi did on Wednesday. “To reiterate: No enrichment, no deal,” Araghchi wrote on X. “No nuclear weapons, we have a deal.”

Such responses by Iranian officials point to a flaw in the administration’s rhetorical strategy. “Trump can’t confuse his domestic critics without also confusing the Iranians and leaving them doubting the reliability of a deal with Trump,” Parsi told me. “Much of this could be avoided if Trump’s style didn’t involve a significant public negotiation component.”

Hardline public rhetoric is prompting pushback not only from Tehran, but also from leading Democrats—though not for the reasons you might expect. Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), in a video statement released on Monday, lambasted the administration’s behind-the-scenes dealmaking. “What kind of bull is this?” Schumer asked. “They’re going to sound tough in public, and then have a side deal that lets Iran get away with everything?”

Given the problems the confusing rhetoric is causing, a more forthright approach would be worthwhile, assuming that Trump, as he claims, really does want to make a deal, not a war, with Iran. With the Russia–Ukraine war raging and Israel escalating its assault on Gaza, getting an Iran nuclear deal is the low-hanging fruit among the president’s foreign policy priorities. Trump said in his inaugural address that he intends to govern as a “peacemaker and unifier.” At this stage, U.S.–Iran diplomacy seems the clearest path to fulfilling that promise.

Moreover, a nuclear deal would, through sanctions relief, bring significant economic benefits not only to Iran, but to America. A new research paper from the Quincy Institute—an advance copy of which was made available to The American Conservative—quantifies just how large those benefits could be. 

In “The Economic Dimensions of a Better Iran Deal,” Hadi Kahalzadeh of Brandeis University writes that, as part of a nuclear deal, Trump should authorize up to $25 billion in annual U.S. exports. Kahalzadeh estimates that the move, by boosting domestic manufacturing, would create 190,000 U.S. jobs annually by 2040. He recommends as well that Trump allow U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries to access Iranian investment opportunities, totaling up to $4 trillion.

The prospect of such an economic windfall no doubt appeals to the businessman-turned-president Trump, but attaining it would require significant sanctions relief. Would Trump actually be willing to so blatantly defy the Iran hawks, who favor a “maximum pressure” campaign to destroy Iran’s economy? This week brought signs that that answer is yes. On Sunday, the Wall Street Journal reported, to the dismay of its editorial board, that the White House had directed executive agencies to halt new sanctions activity toward Iran.

Clearly, Trump is serious about reaching a mutually beneficial agreement with Tehran, even though that means inciting backlash from Iran hawks. Now, to seal the deal, Trump should go beyond the “no enrichment” two-step, and he should abandon any pretense that Tehran will agree to ever cease enriching uranium. According to Geranmayeh, “Iran is highly unlikely to accept a total ban on enrichment within Iranian territory even if it’s at a future long term date.”

As negotiations advance, the White House should either stick to issuing (reasonable) demands behind closed doors, or it should go public with what seem to be the actual diplomatic goals: avoiding war by lifting sanctions in exchange for limits, not a ban, on enrichment. That is what the American people want. And it’s what President Trump, with wise diplomacy, can achieve.

The post Trump’s Baffling Two-Step on Iran appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs

Poland’s President-Elect Has a Chance to Redefine Realism 

Karol Nawrocki could be just the stabilizing influence Poland needs.

Credit: KSikorski/Shutterstock

When Karol Nawrocki was declared president-elect of Poland, most international observers assumed he would act as little more than a custodian of Jarosław Kaczyński’s political will—a loyal figurehead, a party emissary in presidential robes. But there are emerging signs that Nawrocki’s presidency could take a different turn, one marked not by ideological obedience but by calculated independence, diplomatic realism, and institutional maturity. 

If Nawrocki plays his hand wisely, he could steer Poland away from the shrill antagonism of recent years, recalibrate its foreign policy posture, and build a presidency defined by strategic agency rather than partisan allegiance. 

Nawrocki’s background—as head of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), an institution closely aligned with the historical politics of the Law and Justice party (PiS)—positioned him squarely within the nationalist-conservative camp. But it also means he is a product of the bureaucratic-institutional world, not of the party machine itself. 

This distinction matters. 

Unlike previous PiS-aligned figures, Nawrocki has not risen through the ranks as a professional politician, nor does he carry the heavy partisan debts of someone deeply embedded in the party hierarchy. In short: He may owe his presidency to PiS, but he is not made in its image. That gives him space to maneuver. Whether he chooses to use that space is another question. 

Perhaps the most consequential area where Nawrocki could shift the national tone is in Poland’s stance toward Russia. Since 2022, Poland has adopted one of the most hawkish postures in Europe. Foreign policy has at times been driven more by historical trauma and ideological fervor than by strategic calculus. 

Nawrocki is well-placed to restore balance. 

Already, there are signs he may seek closer coordination with other Central and Eastern European leaders who advocate a realist approach to Moscow: Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Robert Fico in Slovakia, Simion in Romania, even members of Germany’s AfD. There is also a natural affinity for Donald Trump’s circle in the U.S. These actors do not deny the challenges posed by Russia—but they also prioritize diplomacy, economic pragmatism, and national interest over moral posturing. 

This does not mean Nawrocki will pivot Poland toward pro-Russian policies, a move that would be political suicide. But it does suggest he may be open to moving beyond the binary of friend and foe toward a more flexible, interests-based diplomacy that puts Poland’s long-term security and economic position first. 

In a volatile geopolitical landscape, that kind of realism is not weakness. It’s survival. 

Another area to watch is who Nawrocki surrounds himself with in the Presidential Chancellery. If he fills the Palace with party loyalists, then the hopes of an independent presidency will quickly fade. But if he instead chooses non-partisan experts, constitutionalists, and foreign policy pragmatists, Nawrocki could transform the presidency into an intellectually credible institution, not merely a ceremonial post or party megaphone. One such figure is General Bogusław Samol, who would be the ideal candidate to lead the National Security Bureau. 

This would echo moves seen in other European countries, where presidents have used their limited formal powers to exercise soft authority, elevate new voices, and influence public debate without entering direct confrontation with the government. 

Given the current state of Poland’s political landscape, with tensions between the ruling coalition and conservative opposition still high, the presidency could serve as a bridge, not a weapon. But that requires Nawrocki to embrace the presidential role as a platform for unity, not polarity. 

Karol Nawrocki is not yet the president of surprises—but he could become one. 

If he chooses independence over obedience, diplomacy over dogma, and substance over spectacle, he could evolve into one of the most consequential and original Polish presidents since 1989. That will not please every faction within PiS. It may frustrate ideological hawks in Brussels and Washington. But it may also allow Poland to chart a sovereign, realistic, and confident course in a fractured world. 

A strategically agile presidency in Warsaw could be exactly what the region needs. 

The post Poland’s President-Elect Has a Chance to Redefine Realism  appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs

Drop NATO’s Pacific Illusion

Europeans should focus on defending themselves, not on pretending to counter China.

Credit: Drop of Light

The Trump administration may be following its predecessor’s policy in looking to NATO for assistance against China. Alas, expecting European military aid in the Pacific is a fool’s errand. The best way for America’s NATO allies to assist Washington would be to take over their own defense in Europe.

On his recent trip to Asia, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth provided a textbook example of mixed signals. When asked what kind of military role Europe should play in the Indo-Pacific, he responded a “big one.” The People’s Republic of China, Hegseth said, “does not appreciate the presence of other countries” there and it would be “useful” if the PRC had to consider their role when developing policy. At the same time, he allowed, “We would much prefer that the overwhelming balance of European investment be on that continent,” meaning Europe. Elbridge Colby, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, has taken a more forthright position that Europeans should worry about their region first.

Nevertheless, some European governments, reluctant to protect their own homelands, succumb to the “Weltmacht temptation” to exercise power on the world stage. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron, ever busy creating security castles in the air, recently visited Asia and insisted that “France is an Indo-Pacific player.” Last month he issued “a call for action for Europe and Asia to work together on a coalition of independents.” This is “the basis of our Indo-Pacific strategy, which is how to preserve an open environment, rule-based order, in the region. And we want to be a reliable partner for that. This is the core of the bilateral commitment we have with Singapore, but with a lot of countries of the region.” Exactly what he had in mind was unclear, but he apparently envisioned a military role. He added, menacingly: “If China does not want NATO being involved in Southeast Asia or in Asia, they should prevent, clearly, the DPRK to be engaged on the European soil.” (He left unexplained how Beijing could prevent North Korea from cooperating with Russia.)

At least France, like the United Kingdom, has experience in deploying its navy to the Pacific. Most European states can only playact beyond their continent. For instance, Germany has a formal “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and four years ago sent the lone frigate Bayern on a Pacific cruise apparently intended to intimidate China—which contemptuously rejected Berlin’s request for a naval visit to Shanghai. Most European NATO members possess minimal navies. Even France and the UK have, respectively, only 22 and 16 principal surface combatants and 9 and 10 submarines. As for the others? The most numerous are Italy with 18 and eight, Turkey with 17 and 13, Greece with 13 and 10, Germany with 11 and six, and Spain with 11 and two. Moreover, Turkey’s and Greece’s fleets are directed at each other, and the quality of other nations’ ships and subs vary widely. Yet two years ago the European Union’s then-de facto foreign minister, Josep Borrell, issued a “call on European navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to show Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area.”

(The issue works the other way as well. Ousted South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol regularly attended NATO summits and cooperated with the transatlantic alliance, despite the far more pressing threat posed by North Korea and sporadic tensions with China. Newly elected President Lee Jae-myung indicated that he is likely to skip the upcoming alliance meeting, and seems less likely to make Europe’s defense a South Korean priority.)

Of course, the ideal would be European security partners able and willing to provide meaningful assistance to America in the event of a confrontation with China. Most important, however, would be a European coalition that possessed sufficient conventional and nuclear assets to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russia and any other unfriendly states in or near Europe. That is, to not insist on the U.S. maintaining tens of thousands of troops and massive amounts of materiel on the continent, backed by a formal security guarantee—seemingly forever.

If the continent took over its own defense, it also could prepare to cooperate economically with America and others in response to Chinese aggression against Taiwan or other regional states. This would be a major improvement over the current system, in which the U.S. is expected to patrol the Asia-Pacific and be prepared to rescue Europe from Russia. 

Another serious problem is Washington’s continued insistence on telling others what they should do. No government, even an ally, likes being ordered about as if it was equivalent to the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Indeed, Macron told the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue: “we want to cooperate, but we do not want to depend. We want to cooperate, but we do not want to be instructed on a daily basis what is allowed, what is not allowed, and how our life will change because of the decision of a single person.” 

Instead of attempting to dictate to the Europeans, the U.S. should explain what it plans to do, while working with them as they craft a response. Although Europe’s decades of anemic military effort reflect calculated cheap-riding, continental governments and peoples also assess threats differently. Even during the Cold War most European NATO members feared a Soviet invasion less than did Washington. European governments insisted on building a natural gas pipeline to the USSR even as U.S. administrations deployed armored divisions, air wings, and tactical nuclear weapons to defend against the presumed Soviet threat.

No surprise, then, European politicians were not inclined to spend more money on their militaries to defend against a danger they believed to be overblown or even nonexistent. Their peoples understandably preferred to construct generous welfare states rather than deploy expansive militaries. These attitudes prevailed until Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Even now, many Europeans perceive little threat from Moscow. The latter has demonstrated neither the desire nor ability to march to the Atlantic, instead singling out Ukraine, which is not a member of NATO. If Russia continues to struggle to make small gains against Ukraine while suffering drone and missile attacks deep within its territory, who imagines that it could conquer the rest of Europe? Even major countries such as Spain and Italy continue to do as little as possible while seeking to avoid widespread censure. Some nominal allies probably would dismantle their militaries entirely if they thought doing so was feasible.

Washington should set out its objective, European self-defense, and means, phased U.S. force withdrawal. European governments then would have to assess the perceived threat and develop their response. Future administrations could work with the Europeans while withdrawing American forces. The Europeans could spend as much or little as they wished, without interference from Washington. However, the latter must not abandon its departure plans, irrespective of the whining and wailing that would inevitably result.

The U.S. should still seek European support against China or involvement in other Asian contingencies as a matter of mutual interest. However, attempting to purchase European aid by treating the allies as helpless dependents in Europe is a losing game. For instance, a number of NATO governments offered limited backing for nonessential U.S. operations in Afghanistan (an official alliance mission) and Iraq (an unofficial multilateral project) in return for Americans’ willingness to risk nuclear war with Moscow on their behalf. That was a bad deal for the U.S. It would have been better for Washington if the Europeans deterred Russia, even if they didn’t participate in regime change operations elsewhere. Similarly, Americans remaining in Europe to defend the continent in the hope that next time Berlin might send two frigates to the Pacific would be a bad bargain.

Yes, it would be great if the Europeans took “a big role” in the Asia-Pacific. But only if the Europeans first take over the defense of Europe. To that end, Washington should stop telling them what to do and instead start telling them what the U.S. intends to do, which is to shift responsibility for the continent’s defense to them.

The post Drop NATO’s Pacific Illusion appeared first on The American Conservative.