Here’s How an Iran Deal Could Work
Trump is positioned to reap real, tangible benefits from a new deal with Tehran.
Donald Trump is eager to be the peacemaker president. As the Gaza and Ukraine wars rage on, there is one file where he has a serious shot: Iran. Prospects of a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal have improved following a recent rally of surprising fast-paced negotiations.
Trump now faces a choice: support a deal that contains Iran’s nuclear program with potential to unlock a lucrative market opportunity for U.S. companies, or risk war—prompting Iran to race for a bomb and potentially costing American lives and extensive military resources.
The U.S. and Iran have held three rounds of indirect talks and one expert meeting in just over two weeks. Following this weekend’s talks in Oman, Trump stated that the negotiations are “going very well” and “We will have something without having to start dropping bombs.” Both countries appear committed to reaching a breakthrough and have agreed to meet again in the coming days. Nevertheless, significant technical hurdles remain, and there are spoilers on many sides seeking to derail the momentum.
The core trade-off seems settled: to deny Iran pathways to a nuclear weapon in return for economic relief. Yet U.S. administration officials are sending mixed messages about its bottom line for an acceptable Iranian nuclear program.
Having for now lost the battle over military strikes, Iran hawks have shifted to derailing the talks. They began by proposing a “Libya model” for the deal that dismantles Iran’s nuclear program. Now they are shifting focus to proposing the repeatedly failed idea that Iran should not enrich any uranium on its soil. Another effort under way is to place restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities in perpetuity.
Iran has rejected these proposals as contravening its rights to peaceful uranium enrichment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran’s ultimate decision-maker, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has clearly green-lit the current negotiations and, for now, boxed in the hardliners who oppose diplomacy and prefer a confrontational approach. Nevertheless, Iran also has its own red lines and over the past 20 years demonstrated it will not capitulate to maximalist demands such as dismantlement and zero enrichment, nor will it disarm itself of its conventional weapons such as missiles.
Contradictory U.S. statements on its position could be intended as trial balloons to test Tehran or appease hawks. They could, however, also indicate that no one—including Trump—knows what he wants. Unless clarified, this weakens the U.S. team’s ability to deliver the swift deal Trump demands and opens space for spoilers.
An active opponent of Trump’s negotiation strategy is Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is pushing the U.S. towards military strikes against Iran and the total dismemberment of its nuclear program. It is not clear whether the U.S. has established any red lines for Israeli attacks against Iran. In a recent interview, Trump noted he did not “stop” Israel from attacking Iranian nuclear sites, although he “didn’t make it comfortable for them.”
While Israel is unlikely to attack Iranian nuclear sites openly so long as U.S.–Iran talks are ongoing, Israel could conduct covert attacks inside Iran (an exercise in which it has a long, successful history). As U.S. and Iranian negotiations kicked off in Oman on Saturday, an unprecedented blast went off in Iran’s biggest port—killing over 40 and injuring 1,200 people. The Iranian government says it is investigating the cause, and has so far not linked the explosion to an attack. Nevertheless, rumors have spread that Israel was the instigator. (A 2020 cyberattack on the same port was attributed to Israel in reporting by the Washington Post.)
Israeli covert attacks would present a dilemma for both Iran and the Trump administration. If Iran counter-escalates, this shrinks the space for Trump to continue talks and may provoke U.S. military support to Israel for further attacks. If Iran walks away from the talks, it fulfils Netanyahu’s plan to sabotage diplomacy and leaves the U.S. more prone to the military option. If Iran doesn’t respond at all, it could encourage continued Israeli attacks. To avoid this trainwreck, President Trump should clearly outline to Netanyahu that there should be no covert or overt attacks inside Iran so long as U.S.–Iran negotiations are moving forward.
The price tag of diplomatic failure is high for both Iran and the U.S. The idea that Iran’s nuclear program can be stopped with a clean surgical strike is a fallacy. Iran now has immense know-how, and enough nuclear fissile material to produce multiple bombs in the space of a few weeks. Without the U.S. occupying Iran, military strikes can at best setback the nuclear program for an estimated year, rather than eliminate it. The U.S. would have to commit resources to regular bombing campaigns inside Iran.
Each bombing round carries risks of an escalatory response against U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in the Middle East and regional allies. A strike could also push Iran toward weaponization in hardened underground sites—something American intelligence recently stated hasn’t happened since 2003. Trump and Iran would probably be consumed by such a military confrontation for years.
Trump and Khamenei seem to recognize that risking conflict is reckless and unnecessary. The two sides now need to keep up the diplomatic momentum. Tehran should accept Washington’s offer for direct high-level talks to speed up a framework agreement defining negotiation goals. This can cement the political buy-in from both sides, making it harder for spoilers to derail negotiations. Holding such talks in Riyadh during President Trump’s upcoming visit could involve Saudi Arabia constructively and protect the process from Israeli sabotage efforts.
Extensive technical talks are required on nuclear measures, economic relief and sequencing of actions. But Trump and Khamenei should initially agree to three new benefits neither side has previously dared to offer.
First, Iran can open itself to the most expansive verification and monitoring ever voluntarily provided by a country over its nuclear program. A new way to enhance verification is for Iran and the U.S. to engage in direct civil nuclear cooperation—with American companies and scientists on the ground. Under the previous 2015 nuclear deal, the UK, Russia, and China signed deals to work within Iran’s nuclear industry. In a new deal, the U.S. and Iran should do the same.
Second, Iran should offer longer caps on restricted nuclear activities than those in the 2015 deal. Arms control agreements are normally time-bound, but often subject to renewal. It is highly unlikely that Iran will agree to restrict all its nuclear activities in perpetuity. However, Tehran should accept long-term sun-sets and agree to renew others at a future date.
Third, a new deal should enable direct trade and investment. One of Trump’s criticisms with the original deal was that the U.S. was easing sanctions against Iran without economically benefiting from it. Lifting U.S. secondary sanctions opened the lucrative Iranian market for Europe, Russia, and China while keeping the door shut to American companies. A new deal should go further by easing U.S. primary sanctions and other legal impediments blocking economic engagement with Iran.
On the Iranian side, there is a stunning rhetorical turn actively welcoming U.S. trade and investment. But even if U.S. sanctions are eased, Iran must overhaul its sanctioned economy and banking system to attract meaningful Western investment. This requires years-long commitment by Iran to root out corruption and mismanagement, and calm the country’s political volatility triggered in large part by human-rights abuses and social repression.
Unlike in 2015, today’s Middle East geopolitics gives Trump a chance to make a U.S.-Iran deal a regional gamechanger. Iran has suffered a blow to its regional deterrence against Israel through the loss of dominance in Syria and Lebanon. Having already been forced to give up certain cards, Tehran may find it more palatable to offer concessions. Simultaneously, Iran has improved ties with Arab Gulf monarchies, opening new opportunities for the U.S.
While the U.S.-Iran deal should stay focused on nuclear issues, it can be interwoven with a separate track of security dialogues between Iran and its Arab neighbors, led by Saudi Arabia. These should involve a robust regional discussion on curtailing the role of non-state armed groups loyal to Iran and strengthening the central states across the Arab world. In return, following the easing of U.S. sanctions against Iran, companies within the GCC states could also move into the Iranian economy. Iran and Saudi Arabia could also start the much-needed dialogue on regional nuclear cooperation, which can further advance international confidence in Iran’s nuclear program.
These measures increase the longevity of a potential U.S.-Iran deal by boosting confidence in Iran, the U.S., and the Arab region. In this way, President Trump can achieve a historic deal that strengthens the non-proliferation regime, makes Israel safer, and gives the Middle East a real chance for stabilization.
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